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Regret and disappointment have in common the fact that they are experi-
enced when the outcome of a decision is unfavourable: They both concern
``what might have been’’, had things been different. However, some regret
and disappointment theorists regard the differences between these emotions
as important, arguing that they differ with respect to the conditions under
which they are felt, and how they affect decision making. The goal of the
presentresearch was to examine whether and how these emotions also differ
with respect to the way in which they are experienced. Participants were
asked to recall an instance of intense regretor disappointmentand to indicate
what they felt, thought, felt like doing, did, and were motivated to do during
this experience (cf. Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994). Signi® cant differ-
ences between regret and disappointment were found in every category.
These differences were most pronounced for ``action tendencies’’ (what
participants felt like doing) and ``emotivations’’ (what they were motivated
to do). These results suggest that the two emotions have differential implica-
tions for future behaviour.
INTRODUCTION
Intense negative emotions are often caused by the outcome of an important
decision. For example, one might feel miserable after buying a car that
turns out to have many faults, or after commencing a relationship that does
not live up to expectations. The same sorts of emotions, but perhaps less
intense, can be felt on a more everyday basis, for example, following a
purchase of a consumer good that happens to be on sale at a reduced price
one week later, or when going to the cinema and seeing a dreadful movie.
Two emotions that are frequently experienced in these situations are regret
and disappointment.
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Ó 1998 Psychology Press LtdRegret and disappointment are common experiences, well known to
most, if not all, of us. Disappointment is one of the most frequently
experienced emotions after failure on a task (Weiner, Russel, & Lerman,
1979). Regret was found to be the second most frequently named emotion
in a study of the use of emotions in everyday language (Shimanoff, 1984).
Because of their commonness and their relation to decision making, these
emotions have been studied extensively by researchers in the ® elds of
social cognition and behavioural decision making (e.g. Gilovich &
Medvec, 1995; Kelsey & Schepanski, 1991; van Dijk & van der Pligt,
1997; Zeelenberg, Beattie, van der Pligt, & de Vries, 1996; for a review,
see Zeelenberg, 1996).
Bad Decisions and Discon® rmed Expectancies
Despite the resemblance between regret and disappointment, theorists in
decision research ® nd it meaningful and worthwhile to distinguish between
them. In regret and disappointment theories (e.g. Bell, 1982, 1985; Loomes
& Sugden, 1982, 1986) it is assumed that people anticipate emotions and
take them into account when making decisions.
According to regret and disappointment theories, regret arises from
comparing an obtained outcome with a better outcome that might have
occurred had a different choice been made; that is, regret stems from bad
decisions. Disappointment arises from comparing an obtained outcome
with a better outcome that might have resulted from the same choice
being made; that is, disappointment stems from discon® rmed expectan-
cies. These alternative outcomes may be real, or construed by the process
of thinking counterfactually (cf. Landman, 1993). The different antecedent
conditions for regret and disappointment are elegantly captured by Land-
man (1993, p. 47) in the following quotation: ``The child is disappointed
when the Tooth Fairy forgets his third lost tooth. The child’s parents regret
the lapse’’ (italics in the original). The difference between regret and
disappointment, as stressed by decision researchers, therefore resides in
the conditions giving rise to the emotions.
The question of whether regret and disappointment also differ with
respect to experiential content is one that is dif® cult to answer, given the
scarcity of empirical evidence addressing this question. The primary
purpose of the present research is to conduct such a study. The main
question to be addressed is as follows: Are regret and disappointment
essentially similar experiences that go by a different name, or are they
two distinct emotions, each with its own characteristics?
We know of only one published study in which experiences of regret and
disappointment were compared. Frijda, Kuipers, and ter Schure (1989,
study 2) studied the extent to which 32 emotions could be differentiated
222 ZEELENBERG ET AL.on the basis of measures of appraisals and emotion action readiness. They
found that regret and disappointment differed with respect to one appraisal
item, ``self-agency’’, and one emotional action readiness item, ``attend-
ing’’. Self-agency was measured by means of the question: ``Were you
responsible for what happened or had happened?’’, and regret scored higher
on this item than did disappointment. However, disappointment scored
higher on ``attending’’ than did regret, implying that after an experience
of disappointment people pay more attention, observe more closely, or try
to understand more, than after an experience of regret.
Additional insight into the experience of regret comes from studies by
Gilovich and Medvec (1994, study 2) and by Roseman et al. (1994).
Gilovich and Medvec asked respondents to write down their ``biggest
regrets’’. Less than 5% of the reported regrets (10 out of 213) concerned
things that were beyond the respondent’ s control, which led Gilovich and
Medvec to conclude (p. 359) that ``it thus seems that a sense of personal
responsibility is central to the experience of regret’’.
1 Clearly, this conclu-
sion is consistent with Frijda et al.’s (1989) ® nding that regret is associated
with higher self-agency scores.
Roseman et al. (1994) have shown that emotions can be differentiated in
terms of distinctive feelings, thoughts, action tendencies, actions, and
emotivational goals.
2 All ® ve response types are assumed to be part of
an emotional experience (see also Frijda, 1987; Plutchik, 1980; Roseman,
1984). Participants in Roseman et al.’s study were asked to recall an
experience of one of 10 negative emotions.
3 These included regret but,
unfortunately for present purposes, not disappointment. After recalling the
experience, participants answered closed-ended questions concerning what
they felt, thought, felt like doing, did, and wanted to do during this
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1 Note that some theorists have argued that regret and responsibility are not related
(Landman, 1993; Rorty, 1980; Solomon, 1976; but see Sugden, 1985). The philosopher
Taylor (1985, p. 98) argued that ``regret but not remorse can be felt about an event for which
the agent does not take herself to be even just causally responsible’’. The relation between
regret and responsibility as stated by these theorists is based on logic and introspection,
rather than empirical investigation.
2 ``Emotivations’’ (or ``emotional motives’’), is a term proposed by Roseman (1984) to
describe the distinct motives or goals that accompany discrete emotions. Emotivations are
different from action tendencies in that the latter term refers to speci® c behavioural
responses, whereas the former refers to desired goal states.
3 In the Roseman et al. (1994) study, participants were asked to recall two emotions, and
answer questions about both. In order to overcome order effects, only the ® rst emotion
recalled was analysed. Because participants knew from the beginning of the study that they
would be recalling two emotions, it is possible that they overemphasised the differences
between the two (cf. Roseman et al., 1994). By using a full between-subjects design we
overcome this possible shortcoming.experience. There were two questions per response type for each of the 10
emotions. Regret was differentiated from other emotions on the basis of
several characteristics. Regret was associated with having a sinking feel-
ing, thinking about what a mistake one has made and about a lost oppor-
tunity, feeling the tendency to kick oneself and to correct one’ s mistake,
actually doing something differently, and wanting to have a second chance
and to improve one’ s performance. Hence, we conclude that the experience
of regret involves a focus on the self as a cause of the event, and on
possibilities for undoing the regret by changing the unfavourable outcome
or by improving future performance.
Less is known about the experiential content of disappointment. How-
ever, if we accept the idea that disappointment arises from realising that the
outcome of a choice would have been better had something else occurred,
we can infer that it is often caused by external events. Hence, a feeling of
disappointment may give people the feeling that they are not always able to
control their own destiny, and that they perceive a lack of control. More-
over, and in contrast to the experience of regret, one should feel less
responsible for causing the event. A consequence of being out of control
is that people become inactive, or focus their attention on unrelated things
(Seligman, 1975).
In sum, we predict that regret and disappointment differ in experiential
content. If participants are asked to report on autobiographic al episodes of
intense regret or disappointment, differences will be found that are con-
sistent with two notions: Regret is felt when one feels responsibility for an
unwanted outcome, and disappointment is felt when outcomes fail to live
up to expectations. In the present study we test these predictions using a
procedure closely based on the one used by Roseman et al. (1994).
METHOD
Participants and Design
First-year psychology students at the University of Amsterdam (N = 313;
109 males, 204 females; ages ranged from 18 to 46, with a median of 20
years) participated in partial ful® lment of a course requirement. The study
was administered as a part of a package of paper-and-pencil tests. It had a
two-group (Regret vs. Disappointment) design. There were 149 partici-
pants in the regret condition, and 164 participants in the disappointment
condition.
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Booklets containing the questionnaires were randomly distributed among
the participants. Participants were asked to recall vividly an occasion in
which they felt either intense regret or intense disappointment. The com-
plete instruction to participants in the regret [disappointment] condition
was as follows (translated from the original Dutch):
We are interestedin the experience of emotional events that are important to
people. You are asked to recall an event in which you experienced intense
regret [disappointment]. Try to recall an experience of regret [disappoint-
ment] that is as authentic as possible,and try to immerse yourself as much as
possible in the feelings you had at that moment. You will succeed best by
going through the event once more step by step, thinking of the character-
istics of the event and how you reacted emotionally to it. Imagine that you
have to give someone a rich description of the event. Think of the feelings
and thoughts you experienced during this event and your reactions to the
event. [pause] Now we are going to ask you some speci® c questions about
your experience of regret [disappointment].
Following this instruction we asked participants about their feelings,
thoughts, action tendencies, actions, and emotivational goals. Each of
these ® ve response types was assessed by means of four items. These
items took the form of statements about their experience of the emotion
recalled. Two items were intended to measure responses typical of regret,
the majority being items adopted from Roseman et al. (1994). The other
two items in each 4-item set were intended to measure responses typical of
disappointment. More speci® cally, respondents were asked: ``When you
felt regret [disappointment], to what extent did you . . . ’’, followed by the
items shown in Table 1. Participants could answer on a 9-point scale, with
end-points labelled not at all (1) and to a very great extent (9). We
expected that the regret participants would score higher on the regret
items, and that the disappointment participants would score higher on the
disappointment items.
RESULTS
Table 1 depicts the mean scores on the 20 response items. A MANOVA
with condition (Regret vs. Disappointment) as the independent variable,
and the response items as dependent variables revealed a signi® cant multi-
variate difference between the two conditions [F(20, 292) = 7.83, P <
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TABLE 1
Means for Each Response Item per Emotion Recalled
Response Type and Item Regret Disappointment F(1,311) P
Feelings
1. Feel a sinking feeling? 5.38 5.59 0.56 n.s.
2. Feel powerless? 5.84 7.08 26.53 .001
3. Feel that you should have known
better?
7.32 5.75 41.41 .001
4. Feel that you lost control? 5.97 6.27 1.35 n.s.
Thoughts
1. Think about what a mistake you
made?
7.09 5.51 34.84 .001
2. Think about what you missed out on? 5.85 6.38 3.44 n.s.
3. Think about a lost opportunity? 5.81 6.01 0.45 n.s.
4. Think about how bad things could
get?
5.01 5.23 0.61 n.s.
Action Tendencies
1. Feel the tendency to kick yourself? 7.11 5.16 56.90 .001
2. Feel the tendency to get away
from the situation?
5.47 6.16 6.11 .014
3. Feel the tendency to correct your
mistake?
6.80 4.89 42.71 .001
4. Feel the tendency to do nothing? 3.36 4.14 8.56 .004
Actions
1. Do something differently? 5.42 5.86 3.20 n.s.
2. Turn away from the event? 4.54 5.23 6.34 .012
3. Change the situation? 5.82 5.64 0.48 n.s.
4. Become inactive? 3.75 4.05 1.36 n.s.
Emotivational Goals
1. Want to undo the event? 7.71 6.89 12.44 .001
2. Want to be far away from what
happened?
5.77 6.20 2.28 n.s.
3. Want to get a second chance? 7.57 6.77 10.73 .001
4. Want to do nothing? 2.97 3.63 8.16 .005
Note: Boldface printed response items were intended to measure the experience of regret,
the remaining items were intended to measure disappointment. Entries are answers to the
questions: ``When you feltregret [disappointment],to what extent did you feel/think/feel the
tendency/did/want’’, followed by a response item. Participants could answer on a 9-point
scale, with end-points labelled not at all (1) and to a very great extent (9). Two-tailed
probabilities are only provided when P < .05..0001].
4 Univariate one-way ANOVAs showed that a signi® cant difference
existed for 11 of the 20 response items, most of them within the response
types emotivations and action tendencies.
5 All signi® cant differences were
in the predicted direction (i.e. regret participants scored higher on the
regret items and disappointment participants scored higher on the
disappointment items).
DISCUSSION
The ® ndings show that regret and disappointment differ in experiential
content. Using a procedure closely based on that used by Roseman et al.
(1994), we found that regret and disappointment can be distinguished with
respect to the feelings, thoughts, action tendencies, actions, and emotiva-
tional goals that comprise the two emotions. The differences were most
pronounced for action tendencies and emotivational goals, which suggests
that the two emotions differ most markedly with respect to their implica-
tions for future behaviour.
On the basis of our ® ndings, the experience of regret can be differen-
tiated from that of disappointment in that the former involves feeling more
intensely that one should have known better, thinking about what a mistake
one has made, feeling a tendency to kick oneself and to correct one’ s
mistake, and wanting to undo the event and to get a second chance.
It is interesting to note that some of the response items that were
characteristic of regret in Roseman et al.’s (1994) study did not differenti-
ate between regret and disappointment in our study, these being: having a
sinking feeling, thinking about a lost opportunity, and doing something
differently. This discrepancy is probably attributable to the fact that regret
and disappointment are more similar to each other than are regret and the
other emotions included in Roseman et al.’s study. It is also worth noting
that two of the three items that we added to those used by Roseman et al.
did distinguish between the two emotions. As stated earlier, participants
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4 A discriminant function analysis showed a similar pattern of results. It also showed that
83.2% of the participants in the regret condition, and 76.2% participants in the disappoint-
ment condition, could be classi® ed correctly based on their scores on the response items
(overall, 79.55% correctly classi® ed).
5 The reader may worry about in¯ ated Type 1 error as a result of using 20 univariate tests.
However, the risk of Type 1 error is limited because the univariate tests were two-tailed,
although the strong predictions for the directionof the expecteddifferences would also allow
less conservative one-tailed testing. Nevertheless, we would like to point out that 2 out of the
11 signi® cant results would not pass a one-tailed Bonferroni± Holm (cf. Holm, 1979) correc-
tion. These are the items: Did you feel a tendency to get away from the situation?, and Did
you turn away from the event?who experienced regret thought more about what a mistake they had made,
and were more motivated to undo the event, by comparison with partici-
pants who experienced disappointment.
To summarise, the ® ndings suggest that regret focuses attention on one’ s
own role in the occurrence of a regretted outcome. It motivates one to think
about how this event could have happened and how one could change it, or
how one could prevent its future occurrence. These ® ndings are consistent
with the claim that regret, as well as being a rather unpleasant state, carries
some clear bene® ts for the individual (cf. Landman, 1993).
Our ® ndings concerning the experience of disappointment show that this
experience, more than that of regret, involves feeling powerless, feeling a
tendency to do nothing and to get away from the situation, actually turning
away from the event, and wanting to do nothing. This suggests that the
experience of disappointment can be more paralysing than that of regret.
However, the ® ndings also suggest that one can set aside an experience of
disappointment more easily than one of regret. Where regretters ruminate
and focus on past events, disappointed people may banish thoughts of
disappointment from their minds and continue with their lives, thereby
avoiding paralysis. Both interpretations may be valid. For example, a
single experience of disappointment might be easy to live with, and might
motivate one to do other things. A sequence of disappointing experiences,
however, might be extremely paralysing because it can result in learned
helplessness (Seligman, 1975).
Having established that regret and disappointment involve different
experiences, we should acknowledge that the two emotions have much in
common with each other. Both are related to decision-making and uncer-
tain outcomes, and both originate in a comparison process in which the
outcome obtained is compared to an outcome that might have occurred.
This raises the question of how the two emotions are related to each other.
Landman (1993, p. 56) has argued that ``regret is a superordinate concept
that subsumes certain de® ning features of disappointment’’. We also favour
the view that the two emotions are related to each other in a hierarchical
manner, but we believe that the relation is the reverse of the one proposed
by Landman.
6 We argue that disappointment is a more general reaction to
an unexpected unfavourable outcome than is regret. Consistent with this
reasoning is the ® nding that (Weiner et al., 1979, p. 1216), ``certain
emotions such as happiness and disappointment are independent of attribu-
tions but dependent on outcomes’’. In order to experience regret, we
suggest, one not only has to perceive the oucome as negative, but one
also has to realise that the unwanted outcome resulted from (or could have
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6 We thank W. Gerrod Parrott for suggesting this relationship to us.been prevented by) one’ s own behaviour. This suggests that disappoint-
ment is the more general emotion and that regret is experienced in cases
where the disappointing outcome is attributed to the self. Although we
cannot test this idea of a hierarchical relationship in our data, the fact that
the ® ndings were more robust for regret than for disappointment supports
the idea that regret is a more speci® c emotion.
Our research supports the contention that regret and disappointment are
different emotions, each with its characteristic phenomenological features.
The present research also leads to some testable hypotheses about the
differential effects of experienced regret and disappointment on future
behavioural decisions. We expect, for example, that experienced regret
results in more active attempts to undo the unpleasant effects of the
decisions that went wrong, and in more elaborate information search for
future decisions, in order to prevent more regret. This does not imply that
experienced regret results in risk aversion, because both risky and safe
choices can result in regret (cf. Zeelenberg et al., 1996). We expect that
experienced disappointment will result in increased attention to other
goals, and in a tendency to avoid future risk-taking. As we argued ear-
lier, disappointment stems from discon® rmed expectancies. Avoiding
future risk-taking is a strategy to avoid more disappointment. Opting for
safe alternatives, leading to certain outcomes that are known in advance,
does not carry the risk of disappointment because the outcomes are known.
In these cases the outcome is the expectation. Outcomes of risky options
are either below or above the expectation level, and can thus give rise to
more disappointment. Research testing these predictions is needed because
until now decision researchers’ interest has been very much focused on the
effects of anticipated emotions. That is, they showed that people’s deci-
sions are in¯ uenced by possible emotions that may occur as a consequence
of that decision. The present research indicates, however, that this is only
half of the story. As emotion researchers know, the emotions that we bring
into a situation can also have a powerful impact on how we behave in that
particular situation.
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